Is there any fourth category?

Question

1) Believers

2) Non believers

3) Hypocrites

Any fourth category?

Wouldn't u say that the hypocrites r non believers too? Only of a worst nature? So they're in a different category. Or should they be in the same category as the non believers?

Answer 1

I think Brother Abul Harith can explain it better ,Bcoz it is very delicate matter of Imaniyat.

As far as i know AHl Kitab is Also kafir .

But there r some exception Allah describes about them ,like we can eat their Zabiha and a muslim man can marry a woman of them

Fasiq is a person whose believes r correct ,but he commits sin.

Hypocrites R of two kinds

1)One is related to Iman(One who did not accepted islam in his heart

2)And the other one is  related to action .this one accept islam in his heart but he commits sin ,

Allah knows best

Answer 2

4.) Idiots who cling to all the false claims of science in the Quran. Those people are too stupid to know the difference between fact and Mohammad's fiction

Answer 3

Agnostics

Answer 4

Categories and Logical Forms in Kant's Metaphysical Deduction

Soraj Hongladarom

Department of Philosophy

Faculty of Arts

Chulalongkorn University

Thailand

--------------------------------------...

The role of the Metaphysical Deduction in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is to show the number and identity of the pure concepts of the understanding. Kant arrives at this conclusion by means of a reflection on the forms of logical judgments, which are argued to correspond in some way to the pure concepts of the understanding.

How is the relation between the logical forms and the pure concepts of understanding possible? In other words, how is it possible that purely abstract logical forms, which are in effect nothing but syntactic means by which one can classify propositions, are closely related to the categories, which are, as Kant tries to show, constitutive of the phenomenal world of science? Kant's text on this matter is known to be obscure. So I would like to propose an answer to the question above, which is that the relation between the logical forms and the categories is a two-way one. Taking a clue from the relation between freedom and moral law in Kant's practical philosophy, I would like to point out that the logical forms are the ratio cognoscendi of the categories, since they provide the key to knowing the categories. On the other hand, the categories are the ratio essendi of the logical forms, for it is the former that are the condition of the possibility of the latter. Kantian commentators usually mention the relation from the logical forms to the categories only, but they seem to ignore the essential role of transcendental and general logics, which is explicitly discussed in the passage from A50/B76 to A64/B88.[1] The distinction will be the basis of my interpretation here.

The paper is divided into five parts. The first part discusses the distinction between the two logics. The second part will concern my argument for the two-way relation in detail. The third part of the paper concerns textual evidence in Kant of the two rationes as well as relevant passages where it can be seen that Kant regards the relation as reciprocal, each in a different way. In the fourth part, I will show how my account differs from the main trend of leading commentators on the Metaphysical Deduction that seeks to show that the logical forms and the categories are to be regarded as not different from each other in essential aspects, but only in that the categories are the logical forms that have been provided, or are considered in relation to, the "transcendental content," which they interpret as some kind of semantic content--what the pure logical forms mean or refer to. Finally, the fifth part will conclude the paper.

I

According to Kant, general logic is the study of derivations among the forms of proposition with the aim of preserving consistency. It is only the study of the forms of judgments, which are subtracted from any particular content. It "considers only the logical form in the relation of any knowledge; that is, it treats of the form of thought in general" (A55/B79). On the other hand, transcendental logic is concerned with what Kant calls "empirical thought of objects"--that is, thought in so far as it is affected by empirical intuitions and hence by the synthesis of the manifold of space and time.

Kant claims that transcendental logic "treat[s] only of the origin of the modes in which we know objects, in so far as that origin cannot be attributed to the objects" (A55/B80). In other words, the subject matter of transcendental logic is the search for and study of how knowledge of objects is possible--the "referring back" to the origin of the mode in which we know object.[2] This referring back obviously does not proceed a posteriori; hence the process is analogous to the role of a priori intuitions in constituting the forms that are presupposed by an act of the mind relating immediately to singular objects. Since transcendental logic is concerned with such an a priori origin, it could not by limited only to the analytical study of pure relations between judgmental forms and of abstracting formal logical rules from such relations. In a nutshell, then, the difference between the two logics according to Kant is as follows: Formal logic treats of formal, syntactical relations between judgments with no regard for their empirical, mathematical or even transcendental, content. Its province does not include how such judgments come about in the first place. Since judgmental forms are abstractions from ordinary employments of concepts in humans' attempts to communicate and to gain knowledge of the phenomena, formal logic is not specifically concerned with the problem of how understanding is successful by means of either empirical, logical, or mathematical judgments. The investigation of the condition of possibility of such employments of concepts and of understanding--the "tracing back to the origin" of the whole process of abstraction--is the domain of transcendental logic.[3]

According to Kant,

Such a science, which should determine the origin, the scope, and the objective validity of such knowledge, would have to be called transcendental logic, because, unlike general logic, which as to deal with both empirical and pure knowledge of reason, it concerns itself with the laws of understanding and of reason in so far as they related a priori to objects (A57/B82-83).

It is clear that transcendental logic is not a treatment of purely formal and abstract relations among propositions. Kant mentions "the origin, the scope, and the objective validity" of knowledge claims, so transcendental logic is limited to the investigation of how such knowledge claims are possible. That they are possible is taken by Kant as obvious and self-evident, as his discussions of such disciplines as geometry and science attest. The task of transcendental logic then forms the main core of the realization of Kant's overall purpose in the Critique, that of showing how synthetic judgments are possible a priori. Transcendental logic cannot be merely another species of formal, logical or conceptual investigation for the simple reason that such enterprise is exhausted by general logic. On the other hand, transcendental logic cannot be a kind of empirical investigation either; in fact, both the formal and empirical claims to knowledge, including, most importantly, the synthetic a priori, presuppose transcendental logic in the first place.[4]

II

This distinction between formal and transcendental logic is the key to understanding the bridge between the table of logical forms and the corresponding table of categories. Looking back at the core text of the Metaphysical Deduction, one finds that the passage from A76/B102 to A80/B106 is very obscure, and it is not surprising to see that many diverging interpretations have been given on it.[5]

According to most commentators, the derivation is only from the logical forms to the categories. It seems natural that the logical forms themselves are somehow the basis from which the corresponding pure concepts of the understanding are derived. Nevertheless, a close examination of the distinction between general and transcendental logic shows that the reverse is also true in a different way. Since general logic is a way according to which the subject comes to have content of knowledge, and since it is the very task of transcendental logic to investigate the origin--the source of one's unassailable right--of one's knowing, both analytically and synthetically, the latter is the more basic investigation in the sense that general logic, according to Kant, is only possible because transcendental logic is its necessary condition. Thus, the logical forms of judgments are already conditioned by the categories by means of unity effected by synthesis.

At the beginning of the section on The Clue to the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding, Kant writes: "If we abstract from all content of a judgment, and consider only the mere form of understanding, we find that the function of thought in judgment can be bought under four heads, each of which contains three moments" (A70/B95). "All content of a judgment" here clearly refers to the total sum of content in language--all the possible sentences in a language, a total body of discourse. Since the logical forms are obtained by abstracting from such discourse, they are crucially dependent on it. The manner in which Kant and the logicians of his day arrive at the Table of Logical Forms at A70/B95 is as follows: They observe the language used in diverse situations and the logical relations of the sentential components of that language. Furthermore, they consider the total sum, the infinitely many sentences in a language which embody all possible meanings or content, which they abstract away. The result of such abstraction is then the Table given by Kant at A70/B95.[6]

Viewed this way, then, the logical forms could be said to owe their origins to discourse. Now the distinction between formal and transcendental logic becomes crucially relevant, for the overall aim of the Critique is to find out how synthetic knowledge is possible a priori, and essential to this project is the role of transcendental logic, which seeks the ground upon which knowledge is possible. Kant tries to show such a priori ground in the Metaphysical Deduction, which can be recognized by reflecting on the logical forms themselves.

Kant argues that the categories constitute such transcendental, a priori ground for discourse. This argument will naturally have to be completed in the Transcendental Deduction; in the Metaphysical Deduction, nevertheless, Kant's purpose is only to point out the correspondence between the two tables. Since transcendental logic is the investigation of the necessary condition of possibility of logical forms, and since Kant has already spelled out the logical forms in the Table, it is natural to assume that there has to be an account of the necessary condition of possibility of the Table itself. General logic shows that there are twelve logical forms, so the task of transcendental logic is to find the condition of possibility for each

Answer 5

Extremist.

Answer my question please, thanks.

http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index;...

Answer 6

4) Fasiq -[ Fasiq is the one who violates / twist etc.. the  shari'ah (Islamic law).

Answer 7

4)i think ahel kitaab cuz Allah mentioned it seperately and not with the kuffaar.

hypocrites w/ non believers? no they're different. Allah called them seperately. Allah mentioned the charecteristics of all 4 groups in the bigening of soora al baqara.

it starts with muttaqoon.

then moves on to mushrikoon

then munafiqoon

then ahel kitaab./bani israel.

and fasiqeen as well.

marwa pleeez change your avatar. you're getting others to do sins.