Where does automatic and controlled arguement stems from in cognitive psychology?

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Answer 1

In a recent paper, Graf and Komatsu (1994) argued that the process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991) is limited in its ability to separate and measure conscious and unconscious forms of memory and so should be "handled with caution." Given that the study of unconscious influences has always posed a difficult problem for memory researchers, we agree with the general emphasis on caution. In this paper, we too advocate caution, especially as it applies to the use of indirect tests, assessing Graf and Komatsu's critique, and using the process-dissociation procedure. We address the substantive issues raised by Graf and Komatsu and also point out the errors, both factual and logical, in their paper. Any method proposing to provide separate measures of conscious and unconscious influences requires judicious use and a careful examination of its underlying assumptions. The assumptions underlying the process-dissociation framework are supported by a large number of experiments spanning a diverse range of conditions. In contrast, the assumptions underlying implicit/explicit test comparisons, when articulated, are found to be flawed and no solutions seem forthcoming. The process dissociation procedure offers researchers the most promising approach for disentangling conscious and unconscious influences.